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ABSTRACT
Background: The perception within literature and populace is that the private for-profit 
sector is for the rich only, and this characteristic results in behaviours that hinder advance-
ment of Universal health coverage (UHC) goals. The context of Northern Uganda presents an 
opportunity for understanding how the private sector continues to thrive in settings with 
high poverty levels and history of conflict.
Objective: The study aimed at understanding access mechanisms employed by the formal 
private for-profit providers (FPFPs) to enable pro-poor access to health services in post 
conflict Northern Uganda.
Methods: Data collection was conducted in Gulu municipality in 2015 using Organisational 
survey of 45 registered formal private for-profit providers (FPFPs),10 life histories, and 13 key 
informant interviews. Descriptive statistics were generated for the quantitative findings 
whereas qualitative findings were analysed thematically.
Results: FPFPs pragmatically employed various access mechanisms and these included fee 
exemptions and provision of free services, fee reductions, use of loan books, breaking down 
doses and partial payments. Most mechanisms were preceded by managers’ subjective 
identification of the poor, while operationalisation heavily depended on the managers’ 
availability and trust between the provider and the customer. For a few FPFPs, partnerships 
with Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and government enabled provision of free, 
albeit mainly preventive services, including immunisation, consultations, screening for blood 
pressure and family planning. Challenges such as quality issues, information asymmetry and 
standardisation of charges arose during implementation of the mechanisms.
Conclusion: The identification of the poor by the FPFPs was subjective and unsystematic. 
FPFPs implemented various innovations to ensure pro-poor access to health services. 
However, they face a continuous dilemma of balancing the profit maximization and altruism 
objectives. Implementation of some pro-poor mechanisms raises concerns included those 
related to quality and standardisation of pricing.
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The private sector is recognised as an important 
source of health care provision in many low-and- 
middle income countries [1–6]. However, the gen-
eral perception in literature available and among the 
populace is that the private for-profit sector is for 
the rich [7–9] and that it can deter progress towards 
achieving Universal health coverage (UHC) [10]. 
The above perception is partly derived from the 
prevailing deficiencies in technical quality for ser-
vices provided in the private sector [11]. Other 
critics have also highlighted over dependence on 
out of pocket expenditure(OPP) which results in 
catastrophic health expenditures among the poor 
[8,12–14] and widens inequities in access to health 
care [6,9].
Post-conflict Northern Uganda presents a paradox 
because there is growing presence of the for-profit 
sector despite (1) the effects of the protracted conflict 
that made the region lag behind the rest of the coun-
try and (2) high levels of poverty in the region [15,16]. 
Therefore, this article, had two specific objectives; 
first, to explore how the Formal private for-Profit 
Providers (FPFPs) identify the poor people in Gulu 
municipality; second, to identify access mechanisms 
employed by FPFPs to promote pro-poor access to 
health services. This study focused on Formal private 
for-profit providers, which are herein abbreviated as 
FPFPs. In this study, FPFPs are defined as facilities 
that are annually registered with the regulatory bodies 
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and therefore appear on the list of registered private 
for-profit providers in Gulu district.
The article draws from a PHD study which focused 
on health care markets in post conflict settings, using 
experiences of formal for-profit health providers 
(FPFPs) in Gulu. The PHD was embedded in 
a program of research called ReBUILD Consortium, 
whose aim was to understand post conflict recon-
struction of the health system in Northern Uganda. 
The article contributes to on-going debates about 
whether private sector, particularly for-profit, should 
or should not be engaged in achievement of Universal 
Health Coverage (UHC). UHC emphasises reduction 
of catastrophic expenditure, provision of quality ser-
vices and expansion of service package [17] as well as 
living no one behind.
Socio-economic and health indicators for 
Northern Uganda
Northern Uganda experienced a 26-year protracted 
armed conflict between the government of Uganda 
and rebels known as the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA), resulting in destruction of property and dis-
placement which hindered livelihoods as well as 
destruction of social safety nets [18–21]. The popula-
tion of Northern Uganda/Northern region which 
comprises of Acholi and Lango sub- regions is quite 
high and this can be assessed using household size 
with Acholi sub-region being (5.5) compared to the 
neighbouring region of Lango(5.1) and national aver-
age of 4.7 [16]. The region reported some improve-
ments to 61% arising from support of the functional 
adult literacy (FAL) programme implemented by the 
Ministry of Gender and Social Development 
(MoGLSD) and partners [22]. However, it is still 
lower than the national average of 73.5% [16]. 
Furthermore, the Northern region, has consistently 
been the poorest region in the country in the last 
decade, with poverty levels above the national average 
[23,24]. Despite the high poverty levels, the Uganda 
National Household Survey (UNHS 2016/17) indi-
cates that a high number of people in Northern 
Uganda (Lango 55%, Acholi 35%) sought treatment 
from a private hospital or clinic, while 6.4% and 7.2% 
of the population in Lango and Acholi sub-regions, 
respectively, sought care from private pharmacies. 
Those who sought care from a public health centre 
were 31% and 53.4% for Lango and Acholi sub- 
regions, respectively. Fewer people in the two sub- 
regions (3.9% and 4.6% respectively), however, visited 
government hospitals [16].
Methods
Study site and sample
This study is based on data collected from March to 
May 2015 in Gulu Municipality, Northern Uganda. 
Data collection methods included a survey of 45 
FPFPs, Organisational life histories (10) with selected 
categories of FPFPs in Gulu Municipality and key 
informant interviews (13) with Regulators at district 
level and directors of professional councils and bodies 
at national level, Health workers in other FPFPs, and 
representatives of other providers e.g. Public and 
PNFP.
For the organisational survey, a list of all the 
registered FPFPs, which was provided by the regula-
tors who work with in the district health office in 
Gulu district, was used as a sampling frame. All the 
organisations that appeared on the sampling frame 
were visited for an interview. Out of the 60 organisa-
tions that appeared on the list, only 45 participated in 
the survey. The remaining 15 were excluded from the 
study for having declined to participate (12) and 
having moved business or having closed business 
despite being on the list (3).
The 10 FPFP units that participated in the organi-
sational life history interviews were selected based on 
criteria derived from results of the preliminary orga-
nizational survey. In particular, the selection was 
based on two parameters; age of/length of stay in 
business and category of organisation. As a result, 
five old and five young FPFPs of varying categories 
were included for life histories. The ‘old’ and young 
organisations were those that had existed in business 
within the area for more than 10 years (>10) or less 
than 10 years, respectively. Facility managers of the 
selected sub-units of the FPFPs who were to partici-
pate in life-history interviews were selected based on 
the position they held in the FPFPs (either as man-
agers or owners of businesses) Table 1.
Participants for key informant interviews were 
selected purposively based on their experiences 
Table 1. Social economic indicators for Northern Uganda.
Year Indicators Region
Northern Uganda Acholi Lango sub-region National average
2012/13 Household size 5 5 5 5
Literacy 60 67.7 71.4 69.8
Poverty estimates 43.7 Ranged from 40.1–55.0 – 19
2016/17 Average Household size – 5.5 5.1 4.7
Literacy levels (%) – 59.7 77.6 73.5
Poverty estimates (%) 33 34.7 17.6 21
Source [15,16,25,26]. 
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derived from having worked in the region for a long 
time (above 10 years), working in other facilities in 
the market in Gulu or in positions of authority in 
relation to the supervision of FPFPs.
Data collection
The organisational survey was conducted by an inter-
viewer using a structured questionnaire. The purpose 
of conducting the survey was twofold – first, to estab-
lish the characteristics of the formal private for-profit 
organisations in Gulu municipality in the post-conflict 
period and, secondly, to facilitate ‘case screening’ [27] 
of FPFPs for organisational life history interviews. 
Case screening refers to the process of selecting parti-
cipants using data provided by a survey but based on 
predetermined criteria. Managers or any other person 
delegated by the manager participated in the survey.
Key informant interviews were conducted using 
a semi-structured interview guide. During the life 
history interviews, a horizontal line (a timeline) was 
drawn on a paper and participants were asked to 
record key events in the life of their businesses. The 
timeline was used to probe for growth dimensions, 
challenges, coping strategies and decisions along the 
life of the business during and after conflict.
Data analysis
Quantitative data were analysed using SPSS version 
17 whereas qualitative data were coded using ATLAS 
ti version 7.0 and then thematically analysed.
Results
The mini-organisational survey showed a variety of 
categories of FPFPs in Gulu municipality. These 
included clinics, clinics with laboratory sections, phar-
macies (exclusively retail or wholesale, a mixture of 
wholesale and retail), stand-alone laboratories, medi-
cal centres, private hospitals, insurance company 
clinics, and others. Others included drug shops, ima-
ging, and medical X-ray centres, ‘health centres’ IIs 
and NGO clinics. All health centres that were operat-
ing on a for-profit basis were at the HC II level. 
Ideally, the term ‘health centre II’ is common nomen-
clature under the public health system in Uganda. It 
refers to the first level of interaction between the 
formal health sector and communities. The health 
centre II is expected to offer a set of services. These 
include preventive, promotive, and curative services 
(mainly Out- Patient). Antenatal services may also be 
available [28]. Some of the FPFPs can acquire the 
same title if they satisfy the requirements of accred-
itation process for this level. As illustrated in Table 2, 
the majority of the FPFPs surveyed were clinics (18), 
followed by drug shops and medical centres (7). In 
addition, there was only one of each of the other 
categories of FPFPs surveyed. The majority of the 
FPFPs were located either along relatively busy streets 
or on the outskirts of Gulu municipality.
Identification of the poor people by the FPFPs
Before implementing the various mechanisms, the 
managers of FPFPs pragmatically applied a subjective 
criterion to identify the poor people. During analysis, 
the criteria was categorised into five main themes 
namely appearance of a person, perceived inability 
to pay bills, perceived level of politeness and place of 
residence and use of coins to pay for services. 
Consequently, individuals who appeared dirty on arri-
val at the facility, who said they were unable to pay 
bills, politely asked for a favour were categorised as 
being poor. Furthermore, those whose place of resi-
dence was located a long distance from Gulu town 
(rural Gulu) and those who brought in coins to pay 
a bill were perceived to be poor. The manager had to 
be present to make the decision on identification of 
the poor.
When you ask the patient to pay 2,000 shillings- [50 
US cents] [. . .] and they tell you they do not have 
money [. . .] start pleading with you that I just walked 
to Gulu town from Ngai, or Opit village. [. . .] if you 
do not help, they would probably have to walk back 
to Opit village without being treated or offered ser-
vices. (P18: LH Manager Old FPFP) 
[. . .] if patient came with coins rather than paper 
notes as payment for the service, it was a sign that 
the person has no money. (P20: LH Manager_ 
Young FPFP) 
Mechanisms employed by FPFPs to enable 
pro-poor access to health services
Various access mechanisms were employed by FPFPs 
to enable the poor to access health services in Gulu 
municipality. These included provision of free ser-
vices and fee exemptions as well as and fee reduc-
tions. There were also some flexibility and practices 
around ensuring that payments were ‘manageable for 






1 Clinic 18 40.0 40.0
2 Drug shop 8 17.8 93.4
3 Medical centre 7 15.6 55.6
4 Pharmacy 5 11.1 66.7
5 Laboratory 2 4.4 71.1
6 Private hospital 1 2.2 73.3
7 Insurance company 
clinic
1 2.2 75.6
8 X-ray and scan centre 1 2.2 95.6
9 NGO clinic 1 2.2 97.8
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clients namely loans, fractions/partial doses and pay-
ment in instalments. The mechanisms are explained 
in detail in the next sections.
Fee exemptions by FPFPs
All the 45 FPFPs interviewed except pharmacies, 
laboratories, private hospitals, and insurance company 
clinics, reported that they offered some fee exemp-
tions (Figure 1). However, fee exemptions were most 
likely to be offered in clinics or medical centres com-
pared to other categories of FPFPs. The categories 
exempted included the elderly, child mothers, adoles-
cents, women within childbearing age (pregnant 
women) and people with disabilities (PWDs).
Survey results showed that fee exemptions were 
more likely to apply to basic support services such 
as consultation, prescription of medicines,sale of 
medicines, family planning and laboratory services 
However more complex services such as X-ray, ENT 
and eye clinic, major surgeries, minor surgeries, 
maternal deliveries, and dental services (Figure 2) 
were less likely to have fee exemptions. Further prob-
ing during qualitative interviews with FPFP managers 
revealed that there were other additional services to 
which fee exemptions applied namely, immunisation 
of children, family planning, HIV testing, screening for 
hepatitis B, diabetes screening and blood transfusion.
Provision of free services and related motives
A few FPFPs, mainly the well-established and/or lar-
ger FPFPs reported provision of free immunisation 
services hence contributing to the broader coverage 
goals of the district. Free immunisation was enabled 
by government subsidies in the form of vaccines, 
fridges for storage and primary healthcare. In return, 
such FPFPs were expected to submit reports to the 
district offices. Other FPFPs reported provision of 
free services such as family planning, HIV testing, 
screening for hepatitis B, diabetes screening was 
enabled by partnerships with non-governmental 
agencies and education institutions within Gulu 
municipality. These services were made accessible 
during health camps whereas the partnerships were 
enabled due to lobbying undertaken by managers of 
certain facilities.
[. . .] we get the vaccines from the district and we do 
UNEPI [immunisation] here and then we give the 
district the report [. . .]. (P15: LH_Manager Young 
FPFP) 
In most cases FPFPs utilised the time when clients 
came in for free services to advertise for other paid 
services which were offered. For instance, when 
mothers came for free immunisation, they would be 
informed about other paediatric-related services 
while those who came up with positive tests during 
the health camps were advised to check with the 
facility for further treatment.
[. . .] If we find that the child also has malaria, we say 




















FPFPs likely to offer  fee exemp"ons (N=45) 
Figure 1. FPFPs likely to offer fee exemptions.
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Services with likely fee exempons (N=45)
Figure 2. Services with likely fee exemptions.
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a facility, and these are not for free. (P4: KI_HW 
other FPFP facility) 
There was an interesting case of a manager who 
explained that their facility provided free services, 
for instance vaccinations, simply because they wanted 
to get rid of reagents that were about to expire.
Price reduction and bargaining
Price reduction was another mechanism employed by 
FPFPs to enable pro-poor access to health services. 
FPFPs were more likely to offer price reductions for 
services such as sale of medicines, consultation and 
the prescription of medicines, blood tests and labora-
tory tests However, more complex services such as 
major surgeries, minor surgeries, ENT, laboratory 
and family planning X-ray, maternal deliveries did 
not attract any fee reduction.
In relation to the category of clients to whom fee 
reductions applied (Figure 3), FPFPs were most likely 
to offer fee reductions to the elderly (7), adolescents 
(5), Persons with disabilities (PWDs) (3), Persons 
Living with HIV/AIDS(PLWHAs) (3) and child 
mothers (3) and pregnant women. Additionally, 
other categories of clients, such as regular customers 
and uninsured patients, needy women and ‘those who 
cannot afford’ were also likely to receive price reduc-
tions. Only one FPFP reported a possibility of offer-
ing fee reductions to NGO staff whereas none of the 
FPFPs was likely to offer fee reductions to former 
abductees. When probed further, during the qualita-
tive interviews, managers noted that majority of the 
NGO staff were insured hence rendering price reduc-
tions useless.
To protect themselves from making excessive 
losses when implementing fee reductions, FPFPs 
exercised price discrimination as well as bargaining. 
In relation to price discrimination some FPFPs 
reported varying fee charges across the perceived 
poor and perceived rich clients while ensuring that 
the latter made up for the shortfall. For instance, one 
of the managers reported reducing the price for those 
clients who were not under insurance cover while 
making the bill higher for those covered by insurance.
In some of the cases, price reductions emerged 
from a bargaining process between the manager and 
a client/patient to create a perception of a ‘win-win’ 
scenario for both the manager and the patient. 
However, in actual sense, clients still lost out and 
the facilities ended up making a profit. For instance, 
one manager reported haggling for the cost of an 
operation for a medical condition and noted that in 
the end, the patient went away with the satisfaction 
that they had negotiation a fair bargain, although the 
provider still got the expected price.
Overall, qualitative interviews also revealed that 
managers of the FPFP facilities were hesitant to pub-
licize price reductions to minimize the chances of 
such incidents happening as well as misuse by pro-
spective well-to do-clients.
‘They say we are money minded [. . .] But we just do 
it quietly, otherwise even those with money will 
come and say that ‘we are being discriminated’. 
(P1: KI_ Manager Other FPFP Facility) 
Loan books and deferred payments
Loan books were commonly reported among ‘small’ 
providers as a strategy for maintaining clientele and 
ultimately dealing with competition with ‘big’ provi-
ders who have a greater market share. Loan books 
enabled the client to pay later and therefore were 
perceived to have reduced the burden/inconvenience 
on the client of paying the whole lumpsum fee. 
Whereas the presence of the manager was an enabler 
for decisions for loans or deferred payments to be 
made, the loan book was mainly an agreement 
between the manager and the client to whom the 
4 4 4
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Services with likely fee reduc!ons(N=45)
Figure 3. Services with likely fee reduction.
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loan was given. Trust between the two parties there-
fore was crucial.
[. . .] we can give you your full dose, but you make 
a commitment to pay. For example, that woman you 
saw, we are giving her treatment for her child, and 
she has a loan book here. She can pay later [. . .] (P4: 
KI Manager Other FPFP) 
Breaking down doses
Breaking down doses was a practice reported by the 
FPFPs to enable those who could not afford to pay 
for the full dose as a lumpsum. This was particularly 
common for malaria doses and was mainly reported 
by managers of smaller FPFPs. Under this arrange-
ment, a client would be given a portion of the dose 
that they could afford on the assumption that they 
would come back the next day with money for the 
next dose. However, this raised quality issues if cli-
ents were unable to return.
[. . .] we tell them [. . .] we have given you for two 
days because of the money you have. You can come 
back for the remaining part of the dose when you get 
the rest of the money [. . .] there are some who go 
and don’t come back, and they will not heal because 
of the incomplete doses but I would not have lost 
money. (P2: KI Manager Other FPFP) 
Discussion
The article has shown that the implementation of any 
equity mechanism requires by FPFPs some measures 
of identification of the poor. Some of the parameters 
used by managers to identify the poor have a specific 
reference to conflict settings, for example, inability to 
pay bills is also indicated in the framework of vulner-
ability as part of the long-term effects of conflict 
which arise from destruction of livelihoods of popu-
lations [29]. Other scholars have termed this situation 
as ‘security-development nexus’ or the poverty- con-
flict nexus. This implies that there is a bi-directional 
relationship between poverty and conflict whereby 
poverty and conflict can reinforce or potentially lead 
to one another [30,31]. Another key finding was that 
application of the parameters for identification of the 
poor was not systematically applied across FPFPs and 
mainly depended on the presence and the mood of 
the manager. Hence, some of the extremely poor are 
likely to miss out on the opportunity to qualify for 
the free services or a reduction in price. There is, 
therefore, a need for a more systematic way of iden-
tifying the poor within the for-profit providers [32].
Our findings provide evidence about innovations 
devised by FPFPs to gain social acceptability and to 
contribute to the advancement of UHC goals. This 
can also be perceived as a contribution to the know- 
how knowledge type, which presents guidance on 
local operational knowledge about good practices by 
the formal for-profit private providers [33]. 
Furthermore, these findings are in contrast with the 
general impression within the literature and common 
perception amongst the populace that the private for- 
profit sector [only] exploits the population by making 
huge profit and deter achievement of UHC goals 
because it reaps off patients [8,12].
Notwithstanding, the findings about pro-poor 
mechanisms implemented by FPFPs further provide 
evidence about the FPFPs’ potential to act as social 
entrepreneurs by acting for a social cause [34]. This 
information contributes to debates around potential 
of the private sector to contribute towards public good 
[10]. Some of the mechanisms enabled a reduction in 
the financial burden that would result from the clients 
paying at one go while some flexibility and practices 
ensured that payments were manageable for clients. 
These included loans, fractions/partial doses, and pay-
ment in instalments. Some of these mechanisms are 
similar to those found in some previous studies con-
ducted among informal providers in relatively stable 
contexts such as India and Bangladesh [35].
Some of the mechanisms for instance breaking 
down doses created dilemmas- where as they stretched 
the burden of out of pocket payment (OOP) over 
a period, hence making it more manageable for clients, 
implications for quality reflected through drug resis-
tance due to failure of the clients return for comple-
tion of their dose. Related concerns about concern 
about quality of services in the for-profit sector in 
relation to breaking down doses has also been high-
lighted elsewhere [35]. Doherty highlights the impor-
tance of strong regulation of the for- profit private 
sector by governments in east and Southern Africa in 
relation to prohibition distortions in quality as well as 
price of health services among other disadvantages 
brought about by the for-profit sector [36].
The mechanisms of extending loans to clients was 
based on trust between the client and the owner of 
the FPFP, which, according to Bloom and colleagues 
[37] reflects ‘social-contractual relationship’ between 
the providers and the clients. Trust is important for 
the effective performance of health systems, given 
that it creates a feeling of satisfaction in connection 
with both clients’ needs/expectations and providers’ 
expectations [37,38]. Another study conducted earlier 
on the private sector in the conflict-affected region of 
Northern Africa also found trust to be an important 
aspect of business [39].
Unlike the young FPFPs, the older FPFPs were 
more likely to provide free services through partner-
ships with government agencies and with NGOs. 
These partnerships with governments although limited 
to a few FPFPs, not only enabled the FPFPs to con-
tribute towards the broader coverage goal for UHC but 
also provided an opportunity for advertisement of 
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other services to increase their perceived market share. 
This finding provides evidence for possible partner-
ships with private for profit sector in post conflict 
Northern Uganda, a bold step from breaking the 40 
decade of including only the Not-for Profit sector 
[28,40].
The findings have shown that FPFPs would like to 
maintain a good image among the public by ensuring 
that they enable access to healthcare services by the 
poor. However, they continuously face a dilemma of 
balancing the optimization of their incomes with the 
altruism objectives and ultimately moving along the 
extreme continuum of social entrepreneurship. This 
dilemma was reflected in; the hesitance FPFPs to 
publicise some mechanisms; FPFP whereas their 
motivation to implement as well as actual operatio-
nalisation of other mechanisms. For instance, some 
FPFPs leveraged the opportunity made available by 
the provision of free services, which was enabled by 
partnerships with other sectors, to market the other 
services that they provided in-house. Furthermore, 
findings indicated that the package of services 
selected for fee exemptions was narrow, and mainly 
focused on prevention and less on some most critical 
services, such as diagnostic and maternal deliveries. 
Therefore, our findings suggest that if FPFPs are to be 
leveraged in terms of UHC, there is need for a more 
comprehensive and clearer package of service.
Notably, the findings indicated that negotiation, 
a key process for one of the mechanisms- that is- 
price reduction has limitations, since some managers 
reported exaggerating the price of treatment while 
withholding information from clients, which is evi-
dence of false billing, one of the unethical business 
practices exercised by private sector in sub-Saharan 
Africa, mainly driven by the ‘pursuit of excess profits’. 
Other unethical business practices by for-profit sector 
include over-servicing, collusion, false billing, price 
gouging, and unlicensed practice [41]. Furthermore, 
the practice of withholding information exercised 
by some of the managers rhymes with the New 
Institution economics concept of information asym-
metry [42].Information asymmetry is a situation 
where one party in a transaction has more informa-
tion than the other and uses this position to take 
advantage of the situation [42,43].
Limitations of the study
The findings of this study need to be considered 
bearing in mind some limitations. The study had 
a supply-side bias hence does not include clients’ 
views and how they perceived/identified a poor per-
son. The study also potentially suffered from a social 
acceptability/desirability because it relied on provider 
self reports of their characteristics and behaviour 
particularly in relation to actions for enabling access 
to the poor [44]. Therefore, it is impossible to cannot 
rule-out the possibility of providers either over- 
reporting good behaviour or under reporting bad 
behaviour [45]. Lastly, there is limited generalizability 
of findings due to the relatively small number of 
organizations that were involved in the organisational 
survey and qualitative interviews.
Conclusions
This study has highlighted experiences of FPFPs in 
relation to enabling the poor to access health services. 
The identification of the poor by the FPFPs was 
subjective and often unsystematic. FPFPs implemen-
ted various innovations to ensure pro-poor access to 
health services. However, they face a continuous 
dilemma of balancing the profit maximization and 
altruism objectives. Implementation of some pro- 
poor mechanisms raises concerns included those 
related to quality and standardisation of pricing.
Recommendations
Based on the above findings, the following recom-
mendations were derived. Regarding identification of 
the poor, there is need for a more systematic way of 
identifying the poor within the for-profit providers to 
ensure that some of the poor do not miss-out. 
Increased regulation can mitigate the quality and 
charging related challenges arising from some 
mechanisms. The package of free services needs to 
be broadened to include curative services. Support to 
FPFPs should be expanded to cover more providers 
and sustained to enable their contribution to wider 
Universal Coverage goals
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